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Abstract
Turing’s much debated test has just turned 70 and is still fairly controversial. His seminal
1950 paper is seen as a complex and multi-layered text and key questions are yet to be
answered. Why did Turing refer to “can machines think?” as a question that was “too
meaningless to deserve discussion” and yet spent the largest section (over 40%) of his
text discussing it? Why did he spend several years working with chess-playing as a task
to illustrate and test machine intelligence only to trade it off for conversational question-
answering in his 1950 test? Why did Turing refer to gender imitation in a test for machine
intelligence? In this paper I shall address these questions directly by unveiling social,
historical and epistemological roots of Turing’s 1950 test. I will show that it came out
of a controversy over the cognitive capabilities of digital computers, most notably with
physicist and computer pioneer Douglas Hartree, chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi,
and neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson. Turing’s 1950 paper is essentially a reply to a series
of challenges posed to him by these thinkers against the view that machines can think. My
goal is to improve the intelligibility of Turing’s test and contribute to ground it in its history.
Keywords: Alan Turing, Can machines think?, The imitation game, The Turing test,
History of artificial intelligence, Mind-machine controversy
1. Preliminaries
Robin Gandy (1919-1995) was one of Turing’s best friends and his only doctorate stu-
dent. He received Turing’s mathematical books and papers when Turing died in 1954,
and took over from Max Newman in 1963 the task of editing the papers for publication
(cf. Moschovakis & Yates, 1996, p. 367-8). Regarding Turing’s purpose in writing his 1950
paper and sending it for publication, Gandy offered a testimony previously brought forth
by Jack Copeland (2004, p. 433) which has not yet been commented about:
It was intended not so much as a penetrating contribution to philosophy but
as propaganda. Turing thought the time had come for philosophers and math-
ematicians and scientists to take seriously the fact that computers were not
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merely calculating engines but were capable of behaviour which must be ac-
counted as intelligent; he sought to persuade people that this was so. He wrote
this paper unlike his mathematical papers quickly and with enjoyment. I can
remember him reading aloud to me some of the passages always with a smile,
sometimes with a giggle. (Gandy, 1996, p. 125)
I shall refer to this as Gandy’s anecdote on the purpose of the Turing test. It think it is
intriguing, for one thing, because it diverges from the widely shared view of Turing’s paper
as the proposal of a decisive experiment for machine intelligence. But more than that, it
suggests that Turing was engaged in a dialogue with “philosophers and mathematicians
and scientists” on the capabilities of (digital) computers. Now, what debate was this? Who
were these interlocutors that Turing sought to persuade? While “the Turing test” is widely
known in philosophy, there is a huge gap of scholarly studies on its history.
2. The problem
Seventy years have passed since Turing’s famous (1950) proposal of an imitation game or
test for machine intelligence, and its available interpretations are still conflicting.
At a first level of discussion, interpreters disagree on whether or not Turing proposed
an experiment to decide for machine intelligence. On the one side, philosophers such as
Daniel Dennett (1984), James Moor (1976; 2001) and Jack Copeland (2000) all provided
support for viewing Turing’s test as such experiment. Dennett wrote that “the Turing test,
conceived as he conceived it, is (as he thought) plenty strong enough as a test of thinking,”
and added “I defy anyone to improve upon it” (p. 297). This class of interpreters found
in Turing’s 1950 paper an epic species test in neglect of any gender test whatsoever, and
posited that the preferable machine-imitates-human test stands as the best experiment to
decide whether or not machines have achieved human-level intelligence. On the other side,
scientists such as Patrick Hayes and Kenneth Ford (1995) and Drew McDermott (2014),
with further support from Marcus et al. (2016), although less certain about what Turing
tried to do in his paper, also tried to take his 1950 proposal of an experiment for ma-
chine intelligence seriously and yet found no philosophical and/or scientific substance in
it. This class of readers complained about the quality of Turing’s experiment description
and design, be it for a gender or a species test. McDermott wrote that “[c]onsidering the
importance Turing’s Imitation Game has assumed in the philosophy-of-mind literature of
the last fifty years, it is a pity he was not clearer about what the game was exactly.”
Furthermore there are those who rejected that Turing’s test addresses an empirical
question. Noam Chomsky wrote in (1995) that ‘can machines think?’ “is not a question of
fact” but one of language (p. 9), and that Turing himself observed that the question is “too
meaningless to deserve discussion.” Blay Whitby (1996) acknowledged the role played by
Turing’s 1950 proposal in the early 1950’s to inspire or drive research. But he claimed that
soon later it became a distraction, for Turing’s test rather measures the human reaction to
a performative machine and this is not a problem in artificial intelligence research. Marvin
Minsky said in (2013) that Turing suggested his test “as one way to evaluate a machine but
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he had never intended it as the way to decide whether a machine was really intelligent.”
So much for these representative classes of interpretation of Turing’s 1950 proposal, we
shall now be ready to proceed. A comprehensive survey was given by Saygin et al. (2000).
The reader may also seek a report on “the Turing test” as a concept in analytic philosophy
with its loose ties to Turing’s historical proposal (Oppy & Dowe, 2003).
Now, in face of this sheer heterogeneity in the secondary literature on the Turing
test, one may wonder that some structural exegesis and well-sourced historiography of
Turing’s 1950 proposal must be helpful. Nonetheless, there is still much room in Turing
scholarship for broad yet close exegetical and historical analyses. Andrew Hodges offered
an account of the test and pointed to the Turing-Polanyi connection (§4.2) in (2009), writ-
ing that Polanyi “encouraged [Turing] to publish his views” (p. 13, no source is given). In
Hodges’ most comprehensive Turing biography (1983), several valuable primary and sec-
ondary sources can be found, and yet Hodges often struggles with Turing’s text in favor of
his own essayistic drives. For instance, he wrote that Turing’s “sexual guessing game” was
“in fact a a red herring, and one of the few passages of the paper that was not expressed
with perfect lucidity” (p. 415). Jonathan Swinton’s (2019) Turing biography provided
plenty of new valuable sources. Regarding Turing’s test, Swinton emphasized in his turn
the Turing-Jefferson connection (§4.3). He pointed that “it was Jefferson’s obtuseness that
provoked Turing into developing this vivid image [the Turing test]” (p. 93, no source is
given). Turing scholar Diane Proudfoot contributed in (2013) a philosophical interpreta-
tion of Turing’s 1950 proposal centered on a specific aspect of Turing’s concept of machine
intelligence, namely, Turing’s (1948) observation that “the idea of ‘intelligence’ is itself
emotional” (p. 411). More broadly, Proudfoot concurs with Copeland’s (2000) defense
of the test as a decisive experiment for artificial intelligence. I shall refer later to Darren
Abramson’s (2011) location of material evidence that Turing read and annotated Jeffer-
son’s 1949 citations of René Descartes. In any case, my point is that there is a need to
connect specific findings such as this to the whole towards a more historically grounded
interpretation of Turing’s 1950 test. I shall call this gap in the secondary literature the
problem of the missing history of the Turing test, whose illustration can be given by the gen-
eral obliviousness on what is brought forward in Gandy’s anecdote but also by key related
exegetical and historical questions which still appear to be largely unanswered:
• If Turing’s goal was rather the proposal of a decisive experiment in avoidance of a
“meaningless” discussion, why did he spend the largest section (over 40%) of his text
addressing objections to the possibility of machine intelligence?
• If Turing was decided about conversational performance as the best intellectual task
to illustrate, develop and test machine intelligence, why did he worked for several
years ever since his wartime service in 1941 up to his 1950 paper with chess-playing
as such task, having even reconsidered it at the end of his 1950 paper?
• If Turing really proposed in 1950 a species test for machine intelligence in neglect of
a gender test, why did he clearly refer to gender imitation in the same source?
I shall start by addressing the first question through a contextualized exegesis of Turing’s
1950 text (§3). Next I shall present crucial historical events in the year of 1949 that shall
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explain Gandy’s anecdote and answer the three questions altogether (§4). My goal is to
improve the intelligibility of the Turing test and contribute to ground it in its history.
3. An interpretive basis for Turing’s 1950 text
Turing’s (1950) text is often said to be accessible for a general readership and yet to be
complex, multi-layered and too ambiguous for scientific and philosophical interpretation if
not even contradictory. So I shall start by addressing its structure as explicitly as possible in
view of improving its intelligibility (§3.1). Then I shall explain his famous and controverted
reference to the question “can machines think?” as “too meaningless to deserve discussion”
(§3.2). Finally I shall present evidence of a method that he used to elaborate his text (§3.3).
3.1. The logical structure of Turing’s 1950 text
Let Turing’s 1950 text be read according to these logical steps:
• (The proposal, §§§1, 2, 3). His new proposal on how best to discuss the question,
“can machines can think?” One possibility, he argues, is to have the discussion on the
basis of commonsense notions of machine back then (say, a steam engine) and think-
ing (say, what humans and humans only do). But this, he observes, would render
the question paradoxical from the start and, in effect, absurd. He poses the imitation
game as an idealized scenario that he designed to be a sensible and proper substi-
tute for what he sees as obsolete commonsense. He comments on the appeal and the
settings of his proposed idealization; in particular, why blind conversational question-
answering makes sense as an intellectual task to empirically evaluate the cognitive
capabilities of digital computers (new machines then existing) to perform something
that, if done by a human being, one ought to call “thinking.” He thus proposes the
imitation game as a vivid and picturesque image that carried inside an (epistemolog-
ical) “criterion for thinking.” Based on the imitation game, he suggests two variants
(a man-imitates-woman version and a (machine-imitates-woman) version) of the new
question in replacement to the original one, and he continues to suggest yet other
variations of it as he proceeds into the next logical steps of his text.
• (The science, §§4, 5). His teaching of what a digital computer is, in language widely
accessible for readers in philosophy, mathematics and science, if not the general pub-
lic altogether. He makes it clear that his proposal (the first logical step) is a philosoph-
ical reflection upon a science, namely, his 1936 mathematical science of computing.
This science is now combined with the technology of stored-program computing that
has been developed (early since the war years at Bletchley Park in Britain, but this
he cannot reveal; and) in the postwar years. This combination was not casual, but
fine-tuned by him and colleagues in order to make digital computers behave or per-
form as universal computing machines. His proposal, it should be clear at the end
of his §5, is not about any sensible imaginary scenario but one that is informed and
constrained by the science and technology of digital computers.
4
• (The discussion, §§6, 7). His negative and positive argumentation — by means of the
science-informed proposal — against a series of nine objections to a positive answer
to the original question (“can machines think?”). As preliminaries, Turing explains
his beliefs and views. For him, the scientific status of the question is in the open.
His own belief is that the answer for the question is positive, but would rather avoid
saying it directly for the very reason why he outlined the proposal in the first place,
namely, to provide a basis for the discussion not to be meaningless. Then proceeding
to the discussion itself he engages into each objection formulated, and systematically
refers to the imitation game in his rebuttal. This was his negative argumentation.
He then advances to present a tentative research agenda for the development of
“learning machines” that could be made to play the imitation game well. These,
once provided with the required storage capacity and a suitable program, would be
able to learn for themselves. In analogy with the education of a human child, his
suggested approach was to find a “child program” that would have initially little
structure and learn from experience so as to eventually exhibit intelligence of its own
in the imitation game. This was his positive argumentation. Both the negative and
the positive argumentation were systematically based on the imitation game.
Now, it is important to emphasize key elements of Turing’s rationale. Without the proposal,
the discussion of the original question (“can machines think?”) would be grounded on
commonsense notions of “machine” and “thinking” back then. From the point of view of
Turing’s goal of proposing conceptual change over the meaning of these words based on a
new science, this would be absurd indeed. And without introducing or teaching the new
science, the proposal might be understood as some silly intellectual exercise in fiction or
fantasy. But given such elemental premises, Turing reasoned, the discussion could finally
unfold. It would then have an empirical basis on his proposed (epistemological) “criterion
for ‘thinking,”’ which was at the same time embedded in a sensible idealized scenario (the
imitation game) to keep an appeal to commonsense.
3.2. Turing’s proposal of conceptual change on the meanings of words
Turing’s reference to “meaningless” has been largely understood as affiliation to positivism,
operationalism or behaviorism. Turing scholars such as Copeland (2000, p. 526) and
Proudfoot (2017) denied it. But then, if the emergence of behaviorism in the early 1950’s
and Gilbert Ryle’s editorship of Mind back then happens to be a coincidence, why would
Turing have referred to the original question as “meaningless”? We shall now examine it.
In the very opening of his text, Turing argued about the dispensability of a definition
for words “machine” and “think” according to commonsense back then. He wrote:
I PROPOSE to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’ This should begin
with definitions of the meaning of the terms ‘machine’ and ‘think’. The defini-
tions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the
words, but this attitude is dangerous. If the meaning of the words ‘machine’ and
‘think’ are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult
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to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, ‘Can
machines think?’ is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But
this is absurd. (Turing, 1950, p. 433)
Turing thus addressed directly the issue of the paradoxical aspect of the combining words
“machine” and “think.” Later in the same text he even reiterated this observation in connec-
tion to the notion of “learning.” He wrote: “[t]he idea of a learning machine may appear
paradoxical to some readers” (1950, p. 458).
Turing’s caveats, however, do not seem to have received enough attention. Wolfe
Mays, for example, who was then a young philosopher and a contemporary of Turing at the
University of Manchester, was asked by Ryle whether he would write Turing a reply (2001).
His contribution ended up appearing elsewhere and was one of the earliest received views
on Turing’s paper (1952). Mays went to the Oxford English Dictionary to promptly show
that Turing had just instilled nonsense. He read from entry “machine” back then:
[A] combination of parts moving mechanically as contrasted with a being hav-
ing life, consciousness and will. Hence applied to a person who acts merely
from habit or obedience to a rule, without intelligence, or to one whose actions
have the undeviating precision and uniformity of a machine.
(Mays, 1952, p. 149, as retrieved from the O.E.D. as of 1952)
The sourced dictionary entry proves that reacting to the original question as “meaningless”
or “absurd” was then a standard intellectual attitude based on culture and commonsense.
Mays overlooked that Turing’s goal was exactly to propose a science-informed con-
ceptual change on the meaning of words “machine” and “think.” Turing had been at least
since early 1947 explicitly challenging the conventional wisdom caught in common phrases
such as “acting like a machine” (1947, p. 393), “purely mechanical behaviour” (1948,
p. 410). The fact that Mays, writing after Turing’s 1950 paper, yet disregarded his opening
plea for a suspension of judgement on the issue seems to explain very well why Turing felt
the need to acknowledge that he understood all too well that the original question (“can
machines think?”) would sound absurd (or “meaningless”), and why he resorted to the im-
itation game as an attempt to provide a new frame of discussion hopefully towards shaking
up people’s intuitions on the original question.
So far we have gained depth into the issue by examining the cultural background
against which Turing posed his famous phrase about the question to be “meaningless.”
Now, let us look back at the internal logic of the (1950) text. In preparation to reach that
passage, Turing pondered: “[w]e cannot altogether abandon the original form of the prob-
lem, for opinions will differ as to the appropriateness of the substitution" (p. 442). He then
proceeded to outline two predictions, the first based on the imitation game, or “the more
accurate form of the question;” and the second based on his suggested conceptual change
over the combination of the two words, and here is where he referred to “meaningless:”
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The original question, ‘Can machines think?’ I believe to be too meaningless
to deserve discussion. Nevertheless I believe that at the end of the century
the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much
that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be
contradicted. (Turing, 1950, p. 442)
The order of exposition is striking. After his reference to “meaningless,” the next sentence
refers to what he expects will happen with the combination of words “machine” and “think”
in society and culture in the future. That is, Turing was conceding that combining the two
words could sound meaningless indeed. The following passage is evidence of his intention
to ground the discussion on the imitation game.
Those who hold to the mathematical argument would, I think, mostly be willing
to accept the imitation game as a basis for discussion. Those who believe in the
two previous objections would probably not be interested in any criteria.
(Turing, 1950, p. 445, emphasis added)
This explains the two first logical steps of Turing’s 1950 text (the proposal and the science).
In fact, Turing’s discussion (the third logical step of his 1950 paper) turns out to
have taken 19 out of 28 pages of it (nearly 70%). There should be little doubt that it was
the very focus of his paper. I shall next present evidence that Turing’s “discussion” was no
casual initiative of his and no vacuous rhetorics. Rather he seems to have felt compelled to
follow a well-known method in the history of philosophy, with a clear goal in mind.
3.3. Turing, reader of Bertrand Russell
Turing made it explicit in his (1950) discussion of the theological objection (p. 443) that
he was a reader of Bertrand Russell’s History (1945), which had appeared only five years
before his 1950 paper and is one of the few pieces in its bibliography. I am not aware of
any commentary on the secondary literature taking notice of this, and yet, I find it to be
a valuable exegetical element to make sense of his 1950 text. Turing turned to Russell’s
book as his chosen reference on the history of western philosophy. I shall take a moment to
examine this by quoting in depth stepwise from Russell, who thus introduced the method:
Dialectic, that is to say, the method of seeking knowledge by question and an-
swer, was not invented by Socrates. [...] But there is every reason to suppose
that Socrates practised and developed the method. [...] Certainly, if he prac-
tised dialectic in the way described in the Apology, the hostility to him is easily
explained: all the humbugs in Athens would combine against him.
(Russell, 1945, p. 92)
If there was hostility to Socrates in Athens, there was hostility to Turing in postwar Britain
as well. For instance, in connection to §4.3 below, in (1949) Jefferson wrote that “the con-
cept of thinking like machines lends itself to certain political dogmas inimical to man’s hap-
piness [and] erodes religious beliefs that have been mainstays of social conduct” (p. 1107).
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Moreover, the platonic figure of Socrates, as known, was a master of irony. And irony was
one of Turing’s preferred tools in debating the conventional wisdom about machines.
Russell remarked that the socratic dialectic method, as it turns out, was the one used
by Galileo in his dialogues to advocate his theories and overcome prejudice. And Russell
pondered about the limits of the method, as exemplified with excellence by Galileo. This
passage may have contributed for Turing to discover Galileo as a hero, as portrayed in the
end of his rebuttal to the theological objection (1950, p. 443-4), and later in his 1951 BBC
radio lecture “Intelligent machinery, a heretical theory” (1951b, p. 475). Russell wrote:
The dialectic method is suitable for some questions, and unsuitable for others.
[...] Some matters are obviously unsuitable for treatment in this way — em-
pirical science, for example. It is true that Galileo used dialogues to advocate
his theories, but that was only in order to overcome prejudice — the positive
grounds for his discoveries could not be inserted in a dialogue without great
artificiality. Socrates, in Plato’s works, always pretends that he is only eliciting
knowledge already possessed by the man he is questioning; on this ground, he
compares himself to a midwife. (Russell, 1945, p. 92-3)
The connection of this passage with Turing’s argumentative approach as exhibited in the
third logical step of his 1950 text (“the discussion”) is striking. Russell discouraged one
to purport to establish any positive grounds for discoveries by means of a discussion. And
along these lines, Turing wrote: “[t]he reader will have anticipated that I have no very
convincing arguments of a positive nature to support my views.” With a tone of irony, he
completed: “[i]f I had I should not have taken such pains to point out the fallacies in con-
trary views.” Via Russell, as it seems, Turing reproduced Socrates’ approach in his negative
dialectic (§6 of his 1950 text), while respecting the boundaries suggested by Galileo’s in
his positive dialectic (§7 of his text) towards the development of learning machines.
Russell resumed to consolidate his observation about the proper use of “the method
of question and answer” by delimiting that it does not apply to empirical problems such as,
say, “the spread of diseases by bacteria.” Then he explicitly suggested the platonic-socratic
method for questions about the meaning and usage of words:
The matters that are suitable for treatment by the socratic method are those as
to which we have already enough knowledge to come to a right conclusion, but
have failed, through confusion of thought or lack of analysis, to make the best
logical use of what we know. A question such as “what is justice?” is eminently
suited for discussion in a Platonic dialogue. We all freely use the words “just”
and “unjust,” and, by examining the ways in which we use them, we can arrive
inductively at the definition that will best suit with usage. All that is needed
is knowledge of how the words in question are used. But when our inquiry is
concluded, we have made only a linguistic discovery, not a discovery in ethics.
(Russell, 1945, p. 93)
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Now, the meaning and common usage of words, namely, “machine” and “thinking,” were
just the central topic of Turing’s 1950 paper. Nonetheless, again in line with Russell’s
point that no positive discovery could come out of an application of the socratic method,
as we have just seen, Turing emphasized that he did not expect to have very convincing
arguments of a positive nature to support his views. He rather declared that “[t]he only
really satisfactory support that can be given for the view expressed at the beginning of
§6” (viz., his prediction about a machine being able to play well a simplified form of the
imitation game) “will be that provided by waiting for the end of the century and then doing
the experiment described” (p. 455). So, because Turing was in agreement with Russell’s
empiricist guidelines, he was compelled to acknowledge that it was only experiment that
could provide satisfactory support for his views on the original question.
Also along the lines of Russell’s exposition, Turing seems to have made a very specific
use of the dialectic method. His goal was “to point out the fallacies in contrary views” to
his hypothesis that machines can think. It is worth to highlight Russell’s point about the
function of this method to elicit truth after fixing “[l]ogical errors:”
We can, however, apply the method profitably to a somewhat larger class of
cases. Wherever what is being debated is logical rather than factual, discussion
is a good method of eliciting truth. Suppose some one maintains, for example,
that democracy is good, but persons holding certain opinions should not be
allowed to vote, we may convict him of inconsistency, and prove to him that at
least one of his two assertions must be more or less erroneous. Logical errors
are, I think, of greater practical importance than many people believe; they
enable their perpetrators to hold the comfortable opinion on every subject in
turn. Any logically coherent body of doctrine is sure to be in part painful and
contrary to current prejudices. The dialectic method [...] tends to promote
logical consistency, and is in this way useful. But it is quite unavailing when the
object is to discover new facts. (Russell, 1945, p. 93)
In fact, Russell proposed the dialectic method to debate philosophical questions. And it
was this method that Turing decided to use in his 1950 paper against his opponents on the
question whether machines can think. Also, he clearly acknowledged that he did not expect
to settle the matter by a philosophical discussion. He rather insisted on the open status of
the question from an empirical point of view. He seems also to have considered, though,
that “logical errors” were the core obstacles in the way of the requisite scientific research
that would lead, in the future, to the actual demonstration of machine intelligence. He
addressed such logical errors in his discussion by referring to “the imitation game” or his
test “as a basis” (1950, p. 445). We shall see next (§4) just what logical errors he addressed.
We have thus learned about what kind of discussion Turing offered in the third
logical step of his 1950 text. In short, it was a socratic dialectic discussion that respected
the empiricist boundaries indicated by Russell to have been exemplified by Galileo.
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4. 1949, the crucial year
In June, computer pioneer Douglas Hartree published his Calculating instruments and ma-
chines (1949). Described in detail in the book, the new electronic computing machines
could do a lot and yet should be seen as nothing but calculation engines (§4.1). Also in
June, distinguished neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson had given his Lister Oration along
the same lines and pushed it further with strong demands to accept that “machine equals
brain” (§4.3) Asked by a reporter from The Times, Turing rebutted to Jefferson sharply, in
wit. This indirect exchange with Jefferson, however, would only make an actual impact on
Turing’s views from October to December 1949 after two editions of a seminar, “Mind and
computing machine,” in the Department of Philosophy of their university. These seminars
were co-chaired by Michael Polanyi, who also engaged in contention with Turing (§4.2).
These three conservative thinkers, all endowed with fellowships of the Royal Society and
more prestigious university professorships while Turing was Reader at the University of
Manchester’s Department of Mathematics, tried to establish boundaries to Turing’s views
on machine intelligence. From June to December 1949 their provocations would resonate
in Turing’s thought and crucially lead to his famous 1950 paper, as we shall now see.
4.1. Turing provoked by Douglas Hartree
Douglas Hartree (1897-1958), Fellow of the Royal Society since 1932 (Darwin, 1958), then
Plummer Professor of Mathematical Physics and member of the Cavendish Laboratory at
the University of Cambridge had given his “short series of lectures” in the early fall of 1948
at the University of Illinois. His related Calculating instruments and machines came out
in about June (1949). Hartree had cited in his May 1949 preface (p. v) the Manchester
“Baby” computer, which had recently been “put into operation.” (Earlier, in February 1946
Hartree had been a key figure for Newman’s Computing Laboratory in Manchester to be
granted funding from the Royal Society, cf. Rope, 2010.) And he kept pushing his public
criticism on the term “electronic brain” (1949, p. 70) as he had been doing ever since his
note on The Times in early November of 1946. It was after Hartree’s 1949 book that Turing
cited and discussed “Lady Lovelace’s objection” (1950, p. 450) or “dictum” (1951a, p. 485).
Hartree drew attention to her views:
Some of her [Lady Lovelace’s] comments sound remarkably modern. One is
very appropriate to a discussion there was in England which arose from a ten-
dency, even in the more responsible press, to use the term “electronic brain” for
equipment such as electronic calculating machines, automatic pilots for aircraft,
etc. I considered it necessary to protest against this usage [Hartree, D. R. The
Times (London), Nov. 7, 1946.], as the term would suggest to the layman that
equipment of this kind could “think for itself,” whereas this is just what it can-
not do; all the thinking has to be done beforehand by the designer and by the
operator who provides the operating instructions for the particular problem; all
the machine can do is to follow these instructions exactly, and this is true even
though they involve the faculty of “judgment.” I found afterwards that over a
hundred years ago Lady Lovelace had put the point firmly and concisely (C, p.
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44): “The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything.
It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform" (her italics).
(Hartree, 1949, p. 70)
Hartree further resumed it in a way that conceded a window for machine learning research:
This does not imply that it may not be possible to construct electronic equipment
which will “think for itself,” or in which, in biological terms, one could set up a
conditioned reflex, which would serve as a basis for “learning.” Whether this is
possible in principle or not is a stimulating and exciting question suggested by
some of these recent developments [...]. But it did not seem that the machines
constructed or projected at the time had this property. (Hartree, 1949, p. 70)
This passage would be quoted and discussed by Turing at length (1950, pp. 450, 454, 459).
Turing was decided to pursue machine learning beyond “reflexes” and “the action of the
lower centres” of the brain at least since his c. November 1946 letter to Ross Ashby (1946).
In fact, as we will now see, in 1949 Hartree was himself writing in reply to Turing.
Back in November 1946, Hartree had been interviewed alongside Turing about the
machine (or “brain”) under construction at the National Physical Laboratory near London,
the so-called Automatic Computing Engine (ACE). (After the Second World War, Turing was
hired to lead the design of the ACE as an implementation of his (1936) universal machine,
while Hartree had been collaborating with Maurice Wilkes on the EDSAC machine at the
University of Cambridge.) On 7 November The Daily Telegraph reported “‘ACE’ will speed
jet flying,” an account based on their interviews but whose headline centered on Hartree’s
views. He would have said: “[t]he implications of the machine are so vast that we cannot
conceive how they will affect our civilisation.” But Hartree meant practical applications of
scientific computing. Turing would have gone his own way: “Dr Turing, who conceived
the idea of [ACE], said that he foresaw the time, possibly in 30 years, when it would be
as easy to ask the machine a question as to ask a man.” The contrast between Hartree’s
view and Turing’s view was marked. Hartree has also been reported to have said in that
1946 interview, in line with his future citations of Lady Lovelace, that “the machine would
always require a great deal of thought on the part of the operator.” And he would have
denied “any notion that Ace could ever be a complete substitute for the human brain.”
This was postwar Britain, and Hartree saw a connection between Turing’s projection for
the machine and authoritarian regimes. He added: “[t]he fashion which sprung up in the
last 20 years to decry human reason is a path which leads straight to Nazism.” This was
in spite of the fact that, as known, Turing served his country bravely in the war and using
computing machines helped to defeat Nazism (Copeland, 2012).
Disregarding Hartree’s play of the Nazi card, Turing must have felt compelled to
respond to what was in essence, say, the Lovelace-Hartree thesis. Soon after their November
1946 interviews, it seems that Turing had already defined what would be his line of re-
sponse. Accepting a premise of the thesis but questioning its conclusion, in February 1947
in his lecture on the ACE to the London Mathematical Society, Turing asked:
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It has been said that computing machines can only carry out the processes that
they are instructed to do. This is certainly true in the sense that if they do
something other than what they were instructed then they have just made some
mistake. It is also true that the intention in constructing these machines in the
first instance is to treat them as slaves, giving them only jobs which have been
thought out in detail, jobs such that the user of the machine fully understands
what in principle is going on all the time. Up till the present machines have
only been used in this way. But is it necessary that they should always be used
in such a manner? (Turing, 1947, p. 392-3)
Turing seems to have observed that the objection raised by the Lovelace-Hartree thesis was
strong and could only be met if machines were made to learn for themselves by experi-
ence, with no need to redesign. He said: “[w]hat we want is a machine that can learn
from experience.” And completed: “[t]he possibility of letting the machine alter its own
instructions provides the mechanism for this” (1947, p. 393). So, when Hartree wrote the
above passage in (1949, p. 70) denying that “the machines constructed or projected at
the time had this property” (of learning to think for themselves), he was already respond-
ing to Turing (February 1947) and perhaps also to Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics (October
1948) after Turing. Wiener reported to have met Turing in the spring of 1947. Among
other generous mentions of Turing, Wiener referred to Turing’s results from his 1936 paper
(1948, p. 125-6) to conclude that “the logic of the machine resembles human logic, and,
following Turing, we may employ it to throw light on human logic.” From that passage,
Wiener proceeded to answer positively to the possibility of the machine to have even “a
more eminently human characteristic,” namely, “the ability to learn.” Wiener made it pub-
lic thereby that he shared Turing’s non-obvious view that machines could be made to learn
for themselves. As we shall see shortly (§4.3), Wiener’s Cybernetics did not pass unnoticed
in Britain and may have contributed to stir Hartree’s reactions.
4.2. Turing provoked by Michael Polanyi
Michael Polanyi (1913-1976), born Hungarian, left Nazi Germany to England to become
Fellow of the Royal Society in 1944 (Wigner & Hodgkin, 1977). In 1948, associated with
the Department of Philosophy and with some support from Professor of Philosophy Dorothy
Emmet, he was granted a new chair of Social Studies at the University of Manchester. (Em-
met, as an Alfred Whitehead scholar, was interested in science and had religious affinities
with Polanyi. Jonathan Swinton presented her profile in 2019, p. 87-90). Emmet and
Polanyi were interested in the postwar public discussion about science and society, and
payed attention to the debate around the new computing machines or “electronic brains.”
So they invited Turing, Newman, Jefferson and others to a seminar on “the mind and the
computing machine,” to be held on 27 October 1949 at the Philosophy Department. This
would be a crucial event. We know of it mostly from minute notes that survived (Turing
et al., 1949). Here I will cover Polanyi’s key interventions that challenged Turing.
The seminar had two sessions. The first session was led by Polanyi, who read a text,
entitled “Can the mind be represented by a machine? Notes for discussion on 27th October
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1949,” which he had prepared and circulated to Newman and Turing several weeks before
the meeting. Essentially, Polanyi claimed that humans can solve problems that machines
cannot. He vindicated support from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Polanyi scholar Paul
Blum found at the Polanyi archive at the University of Chicago a printed copy of that text
containing a few critical annotations by hand (2010, p. 52), which indeed seem to have
been made by Turing. In what survived of the first session of the seminar, we read:
NEWMAN TO POLANYI: The Gödel extra-system instances are produced ac-
cording to a definite rule, and so can be produced by a machine. The mind/machine
problem cannot be solved logically; it must rest on a belief that a machine can-
not do anything radically new, to be worked on experimentally. The interesting
thing to ask is whether a machine could produce the original Gödel paper, which
seems to require an original set of syntheses.
TURING: emphasises the importance of the universal machine, capable of turn-
ing itself into any other machine.
POLANYI: emphasises the Semantic Function, as outside the formalisable sys-
tem. Turing et al. (1949)
This gives evidence that Newman considered, just like Turing, that “the mind/machine
problem” can be decided empirically and only empirically. That is, for Newman as well,
it is not merely a language problem as is sometimes suggested. But more than that, New-
man shifted the discussion around Polanyi’s Gödelian argument to the Lovelace-Hartree
thesis. So Turing and Newman seem to have tried to extract some philosophical meat from
Polanyi’s point. Specifically, Newman had cast the problem of “produc[ing] the original
Gödel paper” as an instance of Lady Lovelace’s objection (the question whether a machine
can “do anything radically new”). And this had been suggested by Turing himself ever
since his February (1947) lecture, when he connected his response to (then yet unnamed)
Lady Lovelace’s objection (p. 392-3) — machine learning — with his response to Gödel’s
argument or the mathematical objection (p. 393-4).
Polanyi’s appeal to a “Semantic Function” would be extended into the second session
of the seminar, chaired by Dorothy Emmet, and lead to new exchanges with Turing. At some
point, we see that Turing would have presented a distinction, to which Polanyi replied:
TURING: declares he will try to get back to the point: he was thinking of the
kind of machine which takes problems as objectives, and the rules by which it
deals with the problems are different from the objective. Cf. Polanyi’s distinc-
tion between mechanically following rules about which you know nothing, and
rules about which you know.
POLANYI: tries to identify rules of the logical system with the rules which deter-
mine our own behaviour, and these are quite different things. Turing et al. (1949)
Here lies the motivation for Turing’s (1950) formulation and rebuttal of the “argument from
informality of behaviour” (p. 452). Now, writing nine years after the October 1949 seminar
in Manchester, Polanyi gave this even more valuable piece of historical information:
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A. M. Turing has shown [Polanyi’s note: in a communication to a Symposium
held on “Mind and Machine” at Manchester University in October, 1949. This
is foreshadowed in ‘Systems of Logic based on Ordinals’, Proc. London Maths.
Soc., Series 2, 45, 1938-9, pp. 161-228.] that it is possible to devise a machine
which will both construct and assert as new axioms an indefinite sequence of
Gödelian sentences. Any heuristic process of a routine character — for which in
the deductive sciences the Gödelian process is an example — could likewise be
carried out automatically. A routine game of chess can be played automatically
by a machine, and indeed, all arts can be performed automatically to the extent
to which the rules of the art can be specified. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 261).
I take two key historical facts related by Polanyi here. The first is that, beyond what
Turing discussed in “the mathematical objection” with a more general audience in mind
(1950, p. 444), in the October seminar he had presented a more technical response to it
was based on his (1936) and (1938) papers as we have seen him saying in the quotation
above, “the universal machine, capable of turning itself into any other machine.” The
second and most important fact for my purpose here is that, as of late October 1949 Turing,
was still referring to the game of chess as intellectual task to illustrate and test machine
intelligence. Nevertheless, we see that Polanyi had classed chess as an art that “can be
performed automatically” because its rules “can be specified.” So Turing had just seen his
well-established reference to machine chess-playing to sound unimpressive to philosophers.
We can now revisit the question: why did Turing make the move of replacing chess-
playing by conversational question-answering as intellectual task to illustrate, develop and
test machine intelligence? Because he noticed that chess-playing would not suit to his goal,
namely — recall from Gandy’s anecdote (§1) —, to persuade “philosophers and mathemati-
cians and scientists to take seriously the fact that computers were not merely calculating
engines but were capable of behaviour which must be accounted as intelligent.”
In fact, in his (1948) Intelligent machinery report Turing had discussed a tradeoff
between most convenient and most impressive intellectual fields:
Of the above possible fields [including “various games e.g. chess”] the learning
of languages would be the most impressive, since it is the most human of these
activities. This field seems however to depend rather too much on sense organs
and locomotion to be feasible. (Turing, 1948, p. 421)
And indeed Turing presented at the end of his 1948 report an imitation test for machine
intelligence based on the game of chess. He thus had kept his choice for chess-playing,
which dated from as early as his wartime service in 1941 (cf. Copeland & Prinz, 2017,
p. 329) and went through late (1945) when Turing asked in his problem 10 “Can the
machine play chess?” (p. 389) and his February lecture (1947, p. 393) and his 1948 report
until the Manchester seminar in October 1949 as related by Polanyi. Now, while in his
1950 paper Turing proposed, as known, conversational question-answering as intellectual
task (within the field of the learning of languages), he reconsidered it at the end:
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We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in all purely
intellectual fields. But which are the best ones to start with? Even this is a dif-
ficult decision. Many people think that a very abstract activity, like the playing
of chess, would be best. It can also be maintained that it is best to provide the
machine with the best sense organs that money can buy, and then teach it to
understand and speak English. This process could follow the normal teaching
of a child. Things would be pointed out and named, etc. Again I do not know
what the right answer is, but I think both approaches should be tried.
(Turing, 1950, p. 460)
In further discussions with essentially the same interlocutors, Turing reassured his proposal
of various forms of viva-voce examination to test machine intelligence (1951a, p. 484;
1952, p. 495), and in the turn from late 1952 to early (1953, p. 569) he reconsidered
chess again. Clearly, chess was more convenient to experiment with at the early 1950’s,
while conversational question-answering was still an imaginary experiment yet preferable
for persuasion. But Turing never determined one single and special form of (species) test to
be a decisive experiment for human-level machine intelligence. He rather acknowledged
the existence of “my” [his] several “imitation tests” (1952, p. 503). In short, I suggest,
Turing felt compelled to shift to linguistic performance for illustrating, developing and
testing machine intelligence, if for nothing else, after Polanyi’s criticism that chess was an
art that “can be performed automatically” because its rules “can be specified.”
So far we have seen that in his 1950 paper Turing responded to criticisms from
Hartree (November 1946 and June 1949), and from Polanyi (October 1949). And yet it
was Jefferson who became Turing’s primary antagonist, as we shall now see.
4.3. Turing provoked by Geoffrey Jefferson
Geoffrey Jefferson (1886–1961), then Professor of Neurosurgery at the University of Manch-
ester and Fellow of the Royal Society since 1947 Walshe (1961), had given on 9 June 1949
in London his Lister Oration when he issued criteria and demands to “agree that machine
equals brain” published later in the British Medical Journal (1949, p. 1110). Jefferson had
entitled his talk “The mind of mechanical man” in response to Norbert Wiener’s (1948) Cy-
bernetics and to the several digital-computer projects in the UK and the US, notably the one
Turing was engaged in hosted at his University of Manchester. A reporter from The London
Times covered Jefferson’s talk and emphasized one of his strong observations, which was
thus quoted the next day (10 June 1949) “No mind for mechanical man” (1949b):
[N]ot until a machine can write a sonnet or a concerto because of thoughts and
emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that ma-
chine equals brain — that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No
mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance)
pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be
made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or miserable when
it cannot get what it wants. (Jefferson, 1949, p. 1110)
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These words of Jefferson’s would be quoted in full by Turing in his discussion of “argument
from consciousness” (1950, p. 445). The reporter from The Times looked for Turing’s lab
at the University of Manchester to get a reply to Jefferson’s claims. Once asked, Turing
replied sharply in wit and with his usual touch of humor. On the next day (11 June 1949),
Turing was thus cited in the newspaper under headline “Calculus to Sonnet”:
Mr. Turing said yesterday: “This is only a foretaste of what is to come, and
only the shadow of what is going to be. We have to have some experience
with the machine before we really know its capabilities. It may take years
before we settle down to the new possibilities, but I do not see why it should
not enter any one of the fields normally covered by the human intellect, and
eventually compete on equal terms”. “I do not think you can even draw the line
about sonnets, though the comparison is perhaps a little bit unfair because a
sonnet written by a machine will be better appreciated by another machine”.
Mr. Turing added that the University was really interested in the investigation
of the possibilities of machines for their own sake. Their research would be
directed to finding the degree of intellectual activity of which a machine was
capable, and to what extent it could think for itself. News of the experiments
was disclosed by Professor Jefferson in the Lister Oration reported in The Times
yesterday. (Times, 1949a)
From this day on a mind-machine controversy was established in England. Two weeks later
when Jefferson’s Lister Oration was published by the BMJ (25 June), Turing did not escape
a warning note from the editorial that opened the edition:
Mr. A. W. Turing [sic], who is one of the mathematicians in charge of the
Manchester “mechanical brain,” said in an interview with The Times (June 11)
that he did not exclude the possibility that a machine might produce a sonnet,
though it might require another machine to appreciate it. Probably he did not
mean this to be taken too seriously [...]. (BMJ, 1949)
Turing would push back. It turns out that a sonnet-writing machine is just what presented
in his 1950 paper. This is evidence that not only Polanyi’s negative point about chess
but also Jefferson’s positive demand about sonnets influenced Turing to drop chess for
conversation. Turing quoted Jefferson’s demands and addressed Jefferson directly:
I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme [...] point
of view. Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as
a test. The game (with the player B omitted) is frequently used in practice
under the name of viva voce to discover whether some one really understands
something or has ‘learnt it parrot fashion’. (Turing, 1950, p. 446)
Jefferson’s (1949) Lister Oration, in fact, had posed a bold critique of the Turing-Wiener
analogy between the new electronic computing machines and the human brain. He spoke
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out against the idea that machines could think and even tied it to “political” and “religious”
issues. He urged that “the concept of thinking like machines lends itself to certain political
dogmas inimical to man’s happiness [and] erodes religious beliefs that have been mainstays
of social conduct” (p. 1107). The influence of Jefferson’s text on Turing’s 1950 paper is
material and enormous, as described next.
Very recent evidence suggests that another edition of the seminar took place in
December 1949. Jonathan Swinton located a Christmas Eve postcard sent to cybernetician
Warren McCulloch then in Chicago by a Jules Bogue, an industrialist in the chemical sector
and neighbor of Max Newman that found his way into the meeting:
I wish you [McCulloch] had been with us a few days ago we had an amusing
evening discussion with Thuring [sic], Wiliams [sic], Max Newman, Polanyi,
Jefferson, JZ Young & myself. An electronic analyser and a digital computer
(universal type) might have sorted the arguments out a bit. Bogue (1949)
Some chaos was noted in the arguments during the discussion in December 1949, which
may explain Turing’s will to propose the imitation game “as a basis for discussion.” (Re-
call that Turing was acquainted with Russell’s History and probaby came across Russell’s
suggestion of the socratic dialectic method for cleaning up logical errors, cf. §3.3).
Now, I have observed that this finding of Swinton’s correlates with what Jefferson
related in a letter after Turing’s death. Jefferson described an event when Turing would
have come to his house to talk to Professor J.Z. Young and him over dinner after a meeting
in the Philosophy Department. The key information that Jefferson gave was that after mid-
night Turing went off to ride home on his bicycle “through the same winter’s rain” (Irvine,
1959, p. xx). So that meeting cannot have been the seminar held on 27 October 1949
(in the fall), and must have taken place in late December (in the winter) near Christmas
eve. In effect, given that the minute notes of the October (1949) edition do not show any
exchange between Jefferson and Turing, it must have been in this December meeting (ex-
tended into late night at Jefferson’s house) that they had their most lively exchanges, and
must have been when Jefferson drew Turing’s attention to his Lister Oration.
We know that Turing possessed and annotated an offprint of Jefferson’s Lister Ora-
tion at the time he was writing his own in January 1950. It has been delivered to the King’s
College Archive at the University of Cambridge after Turing’s death, and the Archive’s cat-
alog entry (AMT/B/44) describes it as having “annotations by AMT (Alan Turing).” Dar-
ren Abramson drew attention to that in (2011). He located two heavy markings in the
offprint, which gives material evidence that Turing read and annotated Jefferson’s text.
Turing marked in pencil two passages: Jefferson’s demands that appeared in The Times as
we have seen above, and Jefferson’s exposition (p. 1106) of René Descartes’s (1637) Dis-
course on method, Part V. The latter presented the sensible image proposed by Descartes, as
known, of a viva-voce examination to distinguish human beings from machines and other
animals however good their imitation of human behavior could look at a first glance. To-
wards the end of his (1949) text Jefferson returned to Descartes to suggest speech as the
most distinctive intellectual faculty of “man” as opposed to “the highest animal” (p. 1109),
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and further required that thinking machines should be able to write a sonnet “because of
thoughts and emotions felt” (p. 1110). So by imagining a machine being questioned about
a sonnet composed by itself in his (1950) imitation game or test (p. 446), Turing addressed
Jefferson’s demands — say, writing a sonnet and passing a viva-voce test about it — both
at once. And there is another move of Jefferson’s that to my knowledge has never been
observed in the secondary literature and yet is crucial for the intelligibility of Turing’s test.
It turns out that Jefferson offered a second image to Turing, and this one was no
less striking. Jefferson referred to “sex hormones” as a distinctive feature of the behav-
ior of “animals” and “men,” as opposed to “modern automata” (1949, p. 1107). In this
connection, he referred to the iconic electromechanical tortoises of Grey Walter:
[...It] should be possible to construct a simple animal such as a tortoise (as
Grey Walter ingeniously proposed) that would show by its movements that it
disliked bright lights, cold, and damp, and be apparently frightened by loud
noises, moving towards or away from such stimuli as its receptors were capable
of responding to. In a favourable situation the behaviour of such a toy could
appear to be very lifelike — so much so that a good demonstrator might cause
the credulous to exclaim “This is indeed a tortoise.” I imagine, however, that
another tortoise would quickly find it a puzzling companion and a disappointing
mate. (Jefferson, 1949, p. 1107)
Jefferson remarked that “neither animals nor men can be explained by studying nervous
mechanics in isolation, so complicated are they by endocrines, so coloured is thought by
emotion.” He then completed: “[s]ex hormones introduce peculiarities of behaviour often
as inexplicable as they are impressive” (p. 1107). In short, Jefferson suggested that ma-
chines could not exhibit enough peculiarities of behavior to be able to imitate the actions
of animals or “men” because they have no sex hormones. A machine would give itself
away and be found to be “a puzzling companion and a disappointing mate.” So, one may
say, Jefferson committed to an a priori assumption that the physiology of sex hormones is
causally related with gendered behavior.
In Jefferson’s passage quoted by The Times in June 1949, it is notable his demand
that for machines to think they should be able to have emotional reactions in general, and
be capable of being “charmed by sex” in particular. In (1950), Turing addressed this in his
discussion of objection (5) “Arguments from various disabilities” (p. 447). Among other
non-obvious things, he considered “fall in love” and “make someone fall in love with it” as
capabilities that do are within the reach of machines. Jefferson’s tortoise challenge, how-
ever, Turing did not respond explicitly. One may note though that for a machine not to
be a puzzling companion and a disappointing mate in the sense of Jefferson, it must be
able to learn and imitate gender. That is, Turing addressed the tortoise challenge in the
very design of the imitation game. He modified the viva-voce examination proposed by
Descartes in (1637) in a few key aspects, one of which was the inclusion of an additional
gendered player B sitting side by side with player A to serve as a baseline model of gender
performance in the unrestricted conversation conducted by the examiner. If player A can
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imitate well the required gender, then it will showcase not only human intelligence in gen-
eral but also the “peculiarities of behaviour” that according to Jefferson would be rendered
by specific (male and female) “sex hormones.”
5. Summary
Turing’s 1950 proposal of a test for machine intelligence is still fairly controversial. His
seminal paper is often said to be accessible for a general readership and yet to be complex,
multi-layered and too ambiguous for scientific and philosophical interpretation if not even
contradictory. In this paper I have provided original answers to key exegetical and historical
questions that have been largely unaddressed so far.
I proposed to read Turing’s 1950 text in three logical steps and found that his ref-
erence to his question “can machines think?” as “too meaningless to deserve discussion,”
rather than an affiliation to behaviorism, was an acknowledgement of the cultural back-
ground back then. The standard intellectual attitude towards a combination of words
“machines” and “think” — as recorded then in the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry for
“machine” — was to take it as meaningless or absurd. Indeed, the logical structure of Tur-
ing’s 1950 paper is tailored for his discussion of that question (§§6, 7 which took nearly
70% of the text) by means of his proposal of an imitation game or test for machine intelli-
gence. I have also explained what kind of discussion was that, namely, a socratic dialectic
discussion that respected the empiricist boundaries indicated by Russell in his (1945) His-
tory to have been exemplified by Galileo.
Indeed, Turing spent several years – from c. 1941 to late 1949 — working with
chess-playing as a task to illustrate, develop and test machine intelligence. At least since
his indirect controversy with Hartree in interpreting the cognitive capabilities of the ACE in
late 1946 Turing was already thinking of making a machine to play chess by learning from
experience. This would establish a concept of machine intelligence that should be enough
to refute the Lovelace-Hartree thesis. But in October 1949 his argument based on chess
received criticism from Polanyi, who was unimpressed and posed that chess was an art
that “can be performed automatically,” for its rules “can be specified.” Not less importantly,
late that year Jefferson drew Turing’s attention to his Lister Oration. In Jefferson’s text,
Descartes’s proposal of a viva-voce examination to distinguish humans from machines and
other animals was appreciated, and speech in general was pointed out as the highest form
of human intelligence — so much so that the climax of the text was to require that thinking
machines should be able to write a sonnet “because of thoughts and emotions felt.” Also in
his Lister Oration, Jefferson had pointed to Grey Walter’s iconic electromechanical tortoises
and suggested that machines could not exhibit enough peculiarities of behavior to be able
to imitate the actions of animals or “men” because they have no sex hormones. A machine
would give itself away and be found to be “a puzzling companion and a disappointing
mate.” In doing so, Jefferson committed to an a priori assumption that the physiology of
sex hormones is causally related with gendered behavior, which Turing challenged through
an irreverent adaptation of Descartes’ test.
Altogether, I have explained Robin Gandy’s anecdote on the purpose of the Turing
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test, and singled out Turing’s most notable interlocutors — the “philosophers and mathe-
maticians and scientists” that Turing “sought to persuade” about the cognitive capabilities
of digital computers. Turing’s direct and indirect discussion with these three thinkers —
Hartree, Polanyi and Jefferson —, I claim, is key for any exegesis of Turing’s 1950 paper
and to an understanding of the conceptual problems he tried to solve in his 1950 test
and/or in his various “imitation tests” (1948-1952). My hope is that this shall improve the
intelligibility of “the Turing test” and contribute to ground it in its history.
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